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THE FUTURE OF SECURITIES LAW IN THE
SUPREME COURT
A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson*
Since the enactment of the first federal securities statute in
1933, securities law has illustrated key shifts in the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence. During the New Deal, the Court’s securities law decisions shifted almost overnight from open hostility toward the newly-expanded administrative state to broad
deference to agency expertise. In the 1940s, securities cases
helped build the legal foundation for a broadly enabling administrative law. The 1960s saw the Warren Court creating
new implied rights of action in securities law illustrative of the
Court’s approach to statutes generally. The stage seemed set for
the rise of “federal corporate law.” The Court swiftly reversed
itself, however, with Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. leading the
effort to confine the reach of the securities laws. Powell succeeded in imposing a strict constructionism in securities law
that never quite took hold in criminal or constitutional law.
When there was a significant shift for the Court, securities law
was prominent—at least until Powell’s retirement. Since then,
the Court has meandered in its approach to securities law, its
decisions neither expansive nor restrictive. The Court’s docket
in this space has become a random walk of indifference.
What is the future of securities law in the Supreme Court?
We doubt that securities law’s bellwether status during its
early days is likely to recur. The Securities and Exchange Commission, a groundbreaking agency of the 1930s, now seems like
a small cog in a much larger administrative machine. Without
prompting from the SEC, it is quite possible that the Court will
continue to meander in the field of securities law. The Court—
which Franklin Delano Roosevelt populated with appointees
* Frances and George Skestos Professor of Law, University of Michigan
and Peter P. Weidenbruch Jr. Professor of Business Law, Georgetown University, respectively. Pritchard acknowledges the generous financial support of the William W. Cook Endowment of the University of Michigan.
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having front-line experience writing the securities statutes,
running the SEC, or defending the constitutionality of the securities laws—has not had a member with any direct experience with securities law for more than thirty years.
If the Court’s spotlight were to shine again on securities, we
suggest it might well be a Chevron question of the SEC’s authority. Proponents of corporate social responsibility could
push the boundaries of the securities laws beyond the SEC’s
historical focus on disclosure. Such a move could also be met
by a federalism challenge to securities law preempting the field
of state corporate law. These possibilities might once again put
securities law at the center of the Court’s work to develop the
law of the administrative state.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The future path of securities law in the U.S. will be influenced by a variety of factors and actors: statues passed by

PRITCHARD & THOMPSON

No. 2:881]

8/22/2021 9:55 PM

THE FUTURE OF SECURITIES LAW IN THE SUPREME COURT

883

Congress, regulations promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and its enforcement of those statutes and regulations, SEC interpretive guidance and occasional special studies; innovations in the markets,
international influences, and developments among the private
parties who buy and sell securities. These disparate influences may generate descriptions of securities law that seem
hard to reconcile at times, as in the traditional fable of the
three blind men who provide widely different descriptions of
touching the same thing because they, individually, are separately interacting with the trunk, body, and tail of an elephant. In this Article, we provide a perspective on the future
of securities law that embraces one part of that elephant: the
role of the Supreme Court.
Our comparative advantage on this topic derives from our
study of the role of the Supreme Court in securities law up
until now. In a forthcoming book—The History of Securities
Law in the Supreme Court—we chronicle the Court’s work in
securities law.1 This history documents several distinct approaches by the Court since the inception of the federal securities laws in 1933. Each new approach was a sharp departure
from its predecessor.
In the 1930s, the tumultuous challenges of the Great Depression were met by a dramatic expansion of the federal government. Nowhere was the expansion more visible than in securities law. The radical changes in the scope of federal
regulation of the securities markets triggered an epic conflict
between the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and
the Supreme Court. That conflict would eventually be resolved by Roosevelt’s appointment of a cadre of progressive
1 That book builds on a series of articles by this Article’s authors, including: A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law in the Sixties: The Supreme Court, the Second Circuit, and the Triumph of Purpose
Over Text, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371 (2018) [hereinafter Pritchard &
Thompson, Securities Law in the Sixties]; A.C. Pritchard & Robert B.
Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal Justices, 95 VA. L. REV. 841
(2009) [hereinafter Pritchard & Thompson, New Deal Justices]; and A.C.
Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the
Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841 (2003) [hereinafter Pritchard,
Powell and the Counter-Revolution].
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Justices to the Court, many of them warriors in the legislative
and judicial battle to assert “social control of finance.” Their
appointments led to a seismic change in the Court’s approach
to federal legislation. The Court’s prior hostility toward economic regulation that interfered with freedom of contract—
the hallmark of the “classical” tradition—dissolved, seemingly
overnight. The new attitude reflected deference to the fledgling SEC.
After a period of relative neglect in the 1950s, the securities cases of the 1960s unleashed a dramatic change in the
Court’s role, if not its direction. Moving beyond mere deference to the SEC’s expertise, the Court took the lead in shifting
insider trading from a clunky statutory regime to one built on
judicially defined rules. The Court also implied private causes
of action for fraud under federal securities law. Those newfound causes of action paved the way for securities fraud class
actions to overshadow the public enforcement regime passed
by Congress in the 1930s.
The Court’s newfound activism would be short lived, and
not repeated. For most of the 1970s and 80s, the Court’s securities decisions were as restrictive as the earlier periods had
been expansive, with the SEC repeatedly rebuffed. That counterrevolution reflected the impact of one Justice in particular:
Lewis Powell.
After Powell’s retirement in 1987, the Court’s path in securities law took yet another direction or, perhaps more accurately, became directionless. The Court’s decisions were neither consistently expansive nor restrictive. The pattern might
be described as equipoise or, less charitably, indifference.
These distinct shifts illustrate four approaches by the
Court in dealing with securities law. Such patterns, in turn,
can help frame predictions for the future. Will history repeat
itself? We acknowledge, and indeed have emphasized in our
prior work, the specific features of each period that shaped the
Court’s jurisprudence during those eras. Those features may
well not be replicated going forward. Add the impact of constant evolution in the markets, and the predictive enterprise
becomes still more fraught. Past results are no guarantee of
future performance.
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At the same time, as our elephant metaphor suggests, the
Supreme Court’s docket is a small slice of the universe of securities law. The Court’s cases have skewed toward certain
topics, although the topics have varied with each era. For example, the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA), 2
the New Deal statute that dominated the Court’s securities
docket in the 1930s and 40s, quickly lost pertinence. Rule 10b5,3 promulgated by the SEC in 1942 but not addressed by the
Court until 1969,4 has repeatedly captured the Court’s attention in the time since. Other broad areas, no less important in
the practice of securities law, have drawn little attention from
the Court. For example, issues under the Securities Act,5 such
as registration, exemptions, and resales, have been the subject of few Court decisions. The Court’s lack of attention to
these areas, notwithstanding their enormous economic significance, is likely inevitable, reflecting the vagaries of litigation
and the certiorari process. Nonetheless, that process results
in the Court addressing only a narrow sub-sample of securities law issues. The Court’s limited focus is likely to persist.
With these caveats in mind, we look to the history of securities law in the Supreme Court to offer some predictions
about its future. Part II describes the prior eras and the distinctive judicial approaches visible in the Supreme Court’s securities cases. Part III evaluates the predictive power of the
previous four dominant Supreme Court approaches in
2 Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA), Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49
Stat. 803 (1935), repealed by Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58,
119 Stat. 594.
3 Prohibition of Fraud by Any Person in Connection with the Purchase
or Sale of Securities, 7 Fed. Reg. 3,804 (May 22, 1942) (codified as amended
at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020)).
4 SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969). More than a decade prior,
in Black v. Amen, the Court was prepared to remand to the lower court to
consider if Rule 10b-5 carries with it a private cause of action, see Letter of
Felix Frankfurter, Just., U.S. Sup. Ct., to Earl Warren, Chief Just., U.S.
Sup. Ct. (Nov. 20, 1957) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection pt. 3,
reel 4, Harvard Law School), but the case settled before the Court’s order
was issued. 355 U.S. 600 (1958).
5 Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77mm (2019)).
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explaining the current environment for securities law at the
high court. We also speculate about some issues that may become prominent in the Court’s docket down the road.

II. THE SUPREME COURT’S EVOLUTION IN
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 1933–2021
The federal securities laws and their administrator, the
SEC, were born at a time when the constitutional framework
of American government was being fundamentally rethought.
The widespread economic distress of the Great Depression
brought calls for reform, captured by the phrase “social control
of finance.”6 As part of that process, the Supreme Court was
challenged to reconsider its role in enforcing constitutional
limits on the federal government. In less than a decade, the
Court abandoned its “classical” approach, reflecting hostility
toward regulation that interfered with “freedom of contract”
or businesses that had only an “indirect” effect on interstate
commerce. The Court essentially abandoned the limits it had
enforced, more or less rigorously, over the prior half century.
The Court’s new trajectory—directed by a wave of Roosevelt
appointees—enthusiastically embraced the New Deal agenda
of social control of finance. This radical transformation was
the first of four very visible shifts in how the Court has approached securities law.

A. From Restrictive Oversight of Regulation to Broad
Support of Agency Expertise
The Supreme Court’s first federal securities law decision,
Jones v. SEC in 1936, was a shocking rebuke to the Roosevelt
administration, then beginning its fourth year.7 The Court
overturned an administrative action brought by the still nascent SEC. The question before the Court was a narrow one of
a registrant’s right to withdraw a registration statement. The
agency had sought to rein in the behavior of a promoter of oil

6

See Pritchard & Thompson, New Deal Justices, supra note 1, at 846–

7

Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936).

72.
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and gas securities, and the promoter had sought to evade the
agency’s regulatory reach by abandoning his offering. The
Court’s language was caustic, impugning the dogged efforts of
the SEC as threatening civil liberties. Justice George Sutherland, the intellectual leader of the “classical” tradition on the
Court, wrote for the majority, going so far as to compare the
fledgling agency’s procedures with the infamous Star Chamber of sixteenth-century England.8 Despite the narrow question decided (the agency had no authority over Jones after he
withdrew his offering), the Court’s rhetoric did not bode well
for the judicial prospects of the other securities statutes that
had been enacted by Congress during Franklin Roosevelt’s
first term, which were making their way up the judicial ladder toward the Supreme Court.
Sutherland’s rhetoric in Jones was shrill, but his approach
proved to be the last gasp of the ancien régime that had prevailed for decades. The following term, the Court embraced a
more accommodating approach to the regulatory statutes of
the New Deal.9 By the end of that term, Willis Van Devanter,
one of the “Four Horsemen” resisting the constitutional revolution, had retired.10 His retirement, encouraged by Congress
providing more generous retirement pay for the Justices,11
was quickly followed by others. Those departures opened the

Id. at 28.
The change is usually marked by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (upholding Washington’s state minimum wage act). See
also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43 (1937) (upholding
the National Labor Relations Act); Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548, 598 (1937) (upholding Social Security tax).
10 Letter from Willis Van Devanter, Just., U.S. Sup. Ct., to Franklin
Roosevelt,
President,
United
States
(May
18,
1937),
http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f4405e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1930/1937_0518_VanDevanterRetirement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EGA6-KGYC].
11 See Judge Glock, Unpacking the Supreme Court: Judicial Retirement
and the Road to the 1937 Court Battle, 106 J. AM HIST. 47, 49 n.6 (2019).
8
9
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door for Roosevelt to appoint eight Justices in just over fiveand-a-half years.12
Roosevelt’s appointees came to the Court with backgrounds that substantially differed from their predecessors’.
Almost all his picks had gained front-line experience across
the legislative, executive or judicial processes in (1) the battle
to enact the securities and other regulatory statutes of the
New Deal, (2) shaping the initial policies of the agencies that
oversaw an increased regulatory oversight of the economy, or
(3) defending the new laws against a hostile judiciary during
Roosevelt’s first term. Felix Frankfurter, for example, while
serving as a Harvard law professor was a key advisor to the
Roosevelt administration in its efforts to draft the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,13 which
empowered the SEC to oversee the stock exchanges and impose disclosure requirements on public corporations. He also
lobbied for PUHCA in 1935, playing a critical role in midwifing its notorious “death sentence” provision intended to
dismantle the public utility conglomerates of the day.14 Hugo
Black, Roosevelt’s first appointee to the Court, also played a
key role in enacting PUHCA, leading the battle in the Senate
against public utility lobbying.15 Stanley Reed had been Solicitor General, among other key legal posts in the Roosevelt administration, and he argued the first regulatory cases that
went to the Supreme Court.16 His successor as Solicitor General, Robert Jackson, had worked his way to that post in part
by playing a key role defending the new securities laws in
court.17 Jackson left his role as the government’s top advocate

12 Those appointed were Hugo Black, Stanley Reed, William Douglas,
Felix Frankfurter, Frank Murphy, Robert Jackson, James Byrnes, and
Judge Wiley Rutledge. Roosevelt also appointed Associate Justice Harlan
Fiske Stone as Chief Justice when Charles Evans Hughes retired in 1941.
13 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Securities Exchange Act), 73 Pub.
L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq
(2019)).
14 Pritchard & Thompson, New Deal Justices, supra note 1, at 862–68.
15 See id. at 867.
16 Id. at 879.
17 See id.
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to replace Frank Murphy as Attorney General when Roosevelt
appointed Murphy to the Court. William O. Douglas, like
Jackson a close confidant of Roosevelt’s,18 was the third chair
of the SEC. In that role, he pushed the agency to displace the
traditional power brokers of the New York Stock Exchange
and began the process of dismantling the public utility conglomerates.19
The new securities laws reflected a fundamental shift in
the role of government and administrative agencies. Social
control of finance called for a new kind of government relying
on agency expertise. The securities laws, and the SEC in particular, were at the center of this political movement.20 Roosevelt’s transformation of the Court laid the groundwork for the
SEC to enjoy an almost unbroken winning streak in the Supreme Court for the first four decades after the agency’s creation in 1934. During that time, the Court consistently deferred
to the SEC’s financial expertise. Moreover, the Court seldom
departed from an expansive interpretation of the securities
laws.

B. A Purposivist Court Further Extends the Reach of
the Securities Laws
After a somewhat fallow period for securities law generally
in the 1950s, the 1960s brought the second shift in the Supreme Court’s approach to securities. This decade is better
known to lawyers and historians for the Warren Court’s expansion of constitutional rights in multiple areas. The securities decisions that expanded the reach of federal law were of a
piece with the Court’s dominant jurisprudence of this era, if
not as well known. The phrase “federal corporate law” was
coined to capture the trend.21

18 L.A. Powe, Jr., Evolution to Absolutism: Justice Douglas and the
First Amendment, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 405 (1974).
19 Pritchard & Thompson, New Deal Justices, supra note 1, at 926.
20 See id. at 872.
21 See Arthur Fleischer, Jr., ‘‘Federal Corporation Law”: An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1146 & n.2 (1965) (noting the rise of the similar
phrase “federal law of corporations”).
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During that decade, the Court not only continued the expansive approach to interpreting the securities statutes that
it had begun in the 1930s22 but went beyond the text of those
statutes to find new remedies for investors. This judicial legislation to create remedies beyond those Congress had expressly written into the securities laws was done in the name
of extending those laws’ purpose, namely investor protection.
This aggressive judicial expansion was primarily evident in
two areas of the law—insider trading and the extension of implied private rights of action. The lower courts had relied on
Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the SEC in 1942, to tackle many
fiduciary breaches that were traditionally the province of
state corporate law. The Supreme Court validated those
broadly remedial interpretations in the 1960s and early
1970s, giving a green light to the lower courts to push still
further in the name of investor protection.23
Congress had addressed insider trading in 1934, but only
via the clunky, mechanistic remedy in section 16(b) of the Exchange Act.24 That provision targeted manipulation by insiders more than trading on informational advantages, leaving
many abuses unaddressed. By the end of the 1960s, the SEC
had persuaded the Second Circuit to deploy the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act to regulate insider trading,25 relying on an earlier Supreme Court decision in that decade embracing a broad reach for a similar provision of the Investment

22 On the rise of this approach in that era, see William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Twentieth-Century Statutory Interpretation in a Nutshell, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1731, 1737–40 (1993).
23 See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (“While th[e]
language [of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act] makes no specific reference
to a private right of action, among its chief purposes is ‘the protection of
investors,’ which certainly implies the availability of judicial relief where
necessary to achieve that result.”).
24 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Securities Exchange Act), 73 Pub.
L. No. 291, § 16(b), 48 Stat. 881, 896 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
78p(b) (2019)).
25 See generally SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc).
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Advisers Act.26 This move to attack insider trading had
seemed impossible in 1934 and for decades thereafter,27 but
the Second Circuit was emboldened by the Supreme Court’s
purposivist approach.
Similarly, the lower courts, and eventually the Supreme
Court,28 extended the reach of Rule 10b-5’s prohibition
against fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security to give shareholders new remedies. These implied
rights of action for shareholders allowed them to pursue mismanagement claims against corporate directors, traditionally
the province of fiduciary duty litigation under state corporate
law.29 In Bankers Life, Justice William O. Douglas, writing for
a unanimous Court, painted with a broad brush, linking traditional securities regulation and fiduciary breaches by managers as all part of “a single seamless web” and therefore actionable under federal securities laws.30 “Federal corporate
law,” developed by the judiciary under the ostensible authority of the securities statutes, appeared poised to occupy the
field.

C. A Strict Constructionist Approach
Until it didn’t. Securities law at the Supreme Court took a
dramatic turn beginning in 1972. As with the two earlier
shifts discussed above, the change reflected a broader trend
afoot at the Court. Once again, securities cases were at the
leading edge. Richard Nixon had run for the presidency in
1968, calling for the Supreme Court to follow “strict
26 See id. at 855 (citing SEC v. Cap. Gains Rsch. Bureau, 375 U.S. 180,
195 (1963)).
27 See WILLIAM H. PAINTER, THE FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 221-23 (1979) (discussing the traditional approach to
fraud that did not extend to nondisclosure in trading in anonymous markets).
28 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971).
29 See generally Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Federal Regulation of Internal
Corporate Affairs, 29 BUS. LAW. 179 (1974).
30 Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 11–12 (attempting to distinguish, however,
mere “internal corporate mismanagement”).
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construction” in construing the Constitution.31 Nixon’s campaign, and subsequent appointments, were directed more toward criminal procedure, and produced some incremental
change in that space.32 By contrast, the change was considerably more pronounced in the field of securities law.
Nixon had made two appointments to the Court in his first
two years—Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice Harry
Blackmun—but neither altered the path of securities law set
in the 1960s. Indeed, Burger and Blackmun joined the most
expansive of the securities decisions, including Douglas’s
Bankers Life “seamless web” decision, the apogee of the purposivist approach.33 But the arrival of Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist on the same day in January 1972 marked a
180 degree turn in the Court’s approach to securities law. The
SEC’s winning streak at the Court ended; the Court’s next
twenty-five securities decisions would be uniformly restrictive, with opinions emphasizing statutory text.34 It is difficult
to imagine a sharper turnabout of a dominant trend on any
topic regularly addressed by the Supreme Court.
This sea change was driven by the influence of one Justice:
Lewis Powell.35 Powell had practiced corporate and securities
law for three decades prior to joining the Court.36 When he
donned the black robe, Powell did not leave his interest in securities law behind. More particularly, he viewed the Court’s
free-wheeling approach of the 1960s as a disaster.37 Powell’s
influence, backed by experience and expertise, not only
31 See Keith E. Whittington, Taking what They Give Us: Explaining the
Court’s Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477, 505 (2001).
32 See id.
33 The other notably broad decision is Blackmun’s opinion for the Court
in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152–53 (1972)
(adopting a presumption of reliance for fraudulent omissions).
34 See E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court
and Private Law: The Vanishing Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53
EMORY L.J. 1571, 1584 & fig.1, 1629 app. A (2004) (showing a nearly-unbroken stretch of “restrictive” securities decisions in the period after 1972).
35 See generally Pritchard, Powell and the Counter-Revolution, supra
note 1.
36 Id. at 847–48.
37 See id. at 863–65.
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pushed the Court toward more restrictive decisions, but also
to take more securities cases. The result was a spike in the
Court’s securities docket and a counterrevolution in the results. Powell would be in the majority in thirty-nine of the
forty securities decisions in which he participated during his
tenure and would write eleven of the opinions, far more than
any other Justice.38 The implied private rights of action that
the Court had announced over the previous decade were restricted.39 Barriers were erected to the implication of any new
implied claims.40 The deference that the SEC had traditionally enjoyed at the Court gave way to a much more skeptical
view from the majority.41 Powell’s dominance of securities law
during his fifteen years on the Court illustrates how one Justice can influence the Court’s docket and direction.

D. Equipoise or Indifference
Powell’s influence can be seen not only in the Court’s holdings during his time on the bench—he wrote more majority
opinions for the Court in securities cases than any other Justice since the adoption of the securities laws42—but also in the
change in the Court’s securities decisions once he retired. The
restrictive view of the prior fifteen terms gave way to what
38 See id. at 858 tbl.1 (tallying that Justice Powell was in the majority
of forty of forty-one securities decisions during his tenure, of which he wrote
twelve). We are now of the view that there were forty securities decisions
during Justice Powell’s tenure, and that Justice Powell wrote eleven of those
opinions. Id. at 858 tbl.1 categorized Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156 (1974) as a securities decision. However, that case actually concerns an
antitrust claim involving securities brokers where the Court decided the
correct interpretation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 159. As such,
while it is an important decision for securities law, it is not a securities decision per se.
39 See id. at 866–73.
40 See id. at 885–91.
41 Id. at 947.
42 See id. at 858 tbl.1 (tallying cases during Justice Powell’s tenure);
John C. Coates IV, Securities Litigation in the Roberts Court: An Early Assessment, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 8 tbl.2 (2015) (extending tally of securities law
cases through 2014); Sullivan & Thompson, supra note 34, at 1629 app.A
(collecting securities cases from 1936 onward).
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has been essentially a fifty-fifty split between expansive and
restrictive outcomes during the more than thirty years since
Powell’s retirement.43 Moreover, the number of securities
cases taken by the Court, which jumped dramatically when
Powell arrived, dropped back to its pre-Powell level upon his
retirement.44 In addition to that numerical decline, the issues
resolved have seemed less important to the practice of securities law.45 In the absence of the frontline experience of the
New Deal Justices, the purposivist resolve of the 1960s Court,
or the dominance of Powell, securities law has lost its bellwether status in illustrating the larger movement of the
Court. This most recent period thus offers a fourth pattern,
with the Court’s decisions perpetually meandering. Securities
law does not generate issues at the top of the country’s political agenda, as it did in the 1930s, and the Court has not had
a Justice with a particular interest in the topic since Powell
retired.46 The resulting path of securities law in the Supreme
Court now looks more like a random walk.

III. WHAT THE PAST MAY TELL US ABOUT THE
FUTURE
What does the past tell us about the future of the Supreme
Court in the field of securities law? We begin in Section III.A
by examining the likelihood that any of the four patterns identified in Part II will recur. We then turn in Section III.B to
consider issues that could alter the path of the Court’s decisions in securities.

See Coates, supra note 42, at 20.
See id. at 7, 8 & tbl.2.
45 For example, the Court now seems obsessed with statute of limitations issues in securities law. See, e.g., Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559
U.S. 633, 646–48 (2010) (interpreting statute of limitations for Rule 10b-5
claims).
46 See Coates, supra note 42, at 26 (“[N]o transactional lawyer—corporate or securities from a nonlitigation perspective—has served on the Supreme Court since Justice Powell.”). Coates’s observation remains true in
2021.
43
44
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A. The Likelihood of the Reappearance of the Drivers
of the 1930s, 60s, or 70s
The first shift described in Part II was principally a response to the Great Depression, but it also reflected a rethinking of the constitutional status of federalism. State securities
law was deemed inadequate to the task of investor protection,
and federal law was introduced to shore up that weakness.
Historical limits on Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause were swept away.47 The role of federalism would
reemerge in each of the shifts of the Sixties and Seventies, albeit in opposite directions. The aggressive purposivism of the
Sixties was driven in part by dissatisfaction with the role of
state courts in enforcing fiduciary standards.48 The Seventies
represented a sharp repudiation of that trend and an affirmation of the states’ role in corporate law.49 Looking to the immediate future, however, we see little chance of another fundamental shift of authority between the state and federal
governments in the fields of corporate and securities laws.
The Court’s first dramatic shift in securities law was the
product of the devastating economic dislocation of the Great
Depression. Both elites and the public had lost faith in the
status quo given the breadth and depth of the economic pain
of the era; the laissez faire of the classical legal tradition
seemed repudiated by events on the ground. Franklin Delano
Roosevelt’s Commonwealth Club speech during the 1932 presidential campaign presaged dramatic developments ahead.50
47 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish gets much of the attention. 300 U.S.
379 (1937). United States v. Carolene Products Co. reflects the broader
trend. 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938) (describing rational basis review).
48 See e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S.
6, 11–12 (1971) (federal securities claims part of “a single seamless web”
with state fiduciary duty claims).
49 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473–74, 478–79
(1977).
50 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Commonwealth Club Address (Sept. 23,
1932), https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdrcommonwealth.htm
[https://perma.cc/8FME-QN6F] (“Our task now is not discovery or exploitation of natural resources, or necessarily producing more goods. It is the soberer, less dramatic business of administering resources and plants already
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Felix Frankfurter, who played a role in the drafting of the first
three securities acts during Roosevelt’s first term,51 had already identified the need for a new approach to government
in his Dodge Lectures at Yale in 1930. He set out the government’s failings and the skills that expert administrative agencies could bring in responding to economic crises.52 A similar
fundamental change was visible—although slow to gain momentum—in the Supreme Court’s approach to constitutional
law and statutory interpretation. Over a fairly short period in
the later 1930s and early 1940s, the Court abandoned the classical approach that had dominated its early-twentieth century
jurisprudence.53 The Court, rapidly transformed by Roosevelt’s second-term appointments, embraced a much broader
role for the federal government and expert agencies in addressing the country’s economic problems.
The second and third shifts discussed in the previous Part
saw a yo-yoing of authority between the state and federal governments. The free-wheeling interpretive approach of the Sixties was propelled by a dominant liberal majority on the Court
and dissatisfaction with the deficiencies of state law in addressing fiduciary breaches to tame corporate mismanagement.54 Federal securities law—”federal corporation law”—
threatened to displace state corporate law in governing the

in hand, of seeking to reestablish foreign markets for our surplus production, of meeting the problem of under consumption, of adjusting production
to consumption, of distributing wealth and products more equitably, of
adapting existing economic organizations to the service of the people. The
day of enlightened administration has come.”).
51 Pritchard & Thompson, New Deal Justices, supra note 1, at 842 (describing how Frankfurter helped choose the drafters of the SEC’s founding
statutes).
52 FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 72–73 (1930).
53 The Court had struck down more than twenty Congressional laws
between 1920 and 1932. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 455 (1st ed. 1960).
54 See Louis Loss, Remarks at the Conference on Codification of the
Federal Securities Laws (1966), in 22 BUS. LAW. 917, 918 (1967) (“[W]hat
we have from 10b-5 was overdue . . . . The common law was strangely laggard in appreciating the fiduciary obligations of directors and other insiders
to shareholders.”).
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relationship between management and shareholders.55 The
pushback of the 1970s and 1980s, in turn, was a response to
the perceived overreaching of the judiciary in promoting federal corporate law on the basis of limited statutory authority.56 A more conservative Court shifted course to preserve the
traditional views of limited federal government and the role of
the states in corporate governance.57
We are skeptical that any of those shifts are likely to recur
soon. The nation has experienced subsequent economic challenges, with the Great Recession that began in 2007/2008
standing out as the most serious financial crisis since the
1930s.58 The lead-up to Great Recession exhibited some of the
same greed and unconstrained market excesses that had
marked the 1920s.59 The problems were exacerbated by the
failure of regulators—including the SEC—to anticipate the
rising dangers.60 The bailouts of key financial players and

55 Fleischer, supra note 21, at 1148 (“It is the thesis of this article that
the growth of federal law in the corporate area is sound and consistent with
the scope and purposes of the securities laws and that the critics’ attacks
are misdirected.”).
56 See Pritchard & Thompson, Securities Law in the Sixties, supra note
1, at 430.
57 See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473–74, 478–79 (1977).
58 See, e.g., Chart Book: The Legacy of the Great Recession, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (June 6, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/economy/the-legacy-of-the-great-recession [https://perma.cc/45JRTWBK] (describing the Great Recession as the worst economic downturn in
the United States since the Great Depression).
59 See, e.g., Systemic Risk: Examining Regulators’ Ability To Respond
to Threats to the Financial System: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 110th Cong. 12–13 (2007) (statement of Robert Kuttner, Editor, Am.
Prospect) (“Although the particulars [of the Great Depression and the Great
Recession] are different . . ., financial history suggests that the risks and
abuses are enduring. They are variations on a few hearty perennials: Excess
leverage, conflicts of interest, nontransparency, misrepresentation, and engineered euphoria.”).
60 See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled
Collapse,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
26,
2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/27/business/27sec.html
[https://perma.cc/Z75E-YAJ3]
(describing an Inspector General’s report that concluded “that the S.E.C.
division that oversees trading and markets had failed to update the rules of
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enhanced financial reforms such as the Volcker Rule61 and the
creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)62
were the most dramatic regulatory changes in finance since
the New Deal. But it was scarcely the regulatory tsunami of
the 1930s. These new regulatory interventions were overlaid
over the plethora of regulatory bodies that had grown up since
1929. The Great Recession did not fuel a political movement
to displace the SEC and other regulators, although Congress
did lay on additional responsibilities.63
In the 1930s, the SEC had been the fair-haired child of regulatory reform, perhaps because the agency was starting from
a blank slate, unencumbered by pre-New Deal political compromises. Moreover, the new agency was not populated with
carry-overs from prior administrations, but instead became a
magnet for enthusiastic New Dealers, many of them new to
Washington.64 It was no surprise, then, that the Roosevelt administration assigned the SEC the central role when the government took on the daunting task of reorganizing the holding
companies that controlled electrical power production and gas
distribution across the country.65 Three years later, the
the [voluntary supervision] program and was ‘not fulfilling its obligations.’”).
61 See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1620–31 (2010) (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. 1851 (2019)).
62 See id. § 113 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323).
63 The Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 did add one new regulatory agency, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). Id. § 1011 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 5491). But the CFPB was limited in its impact by the Trump administration’s hostility including the pursuit of a Supreme Court challenge
in which the Court declared the statute’s “for cause” limitation of the President’s removal power over the Bureau’s single director unconstitutional.
Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020).
64 James Landis, a Harvard faculty member whom Felix Frankfurter
brought to Washington to help draft the 1933 Act (along with two other
Frankfurter protégés, Thomas Corcoran and Ben Cohen) became the second
chair of the SEC. See Pritchard & Thompson, New Deal Justices, supra note
1, at 850, 870. William O. Douglas from the Yale faculty joined the staff of
the new SEC and became its third chair. See id. at 852, 870.
65 See generally Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA), Pub. L.
No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (entrusting administration of the statute to
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Chandler Act gave the SEC a critical role in business reorganizations generally.66 In between, the agency, under the harddriving leadership of William O. Douglas, a future Supreme
Court Justice, had seized the lead in regulating the stock markets. In his more ambitious moments, Douglas flirted not only
with federal incorporation, but also with a government takeover of investment banking.67 The SEC was the New Deal’s “go
to” agency for regulating business.
By 2008, the SEC seemed a much smaller cog in a much
larger federal regulatory system, with the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and other agencies thought to be more significant. Moreover, the agency had utterly failed in its role of
overseeing the risk management practices of the investment
banks that played an outsize role in the unraveling of the financial markets.68 The implementation of the Volcker Rule,
intended to limit that risk, was shared among five agencies.69
The SEC is one of nine agencies whose chairs serve on the
FSOC under the Secretary of the Treasury.70 The SEC increasingly appears to be a small voice in a larger chorus.
The financial crisis leading to the Great Recession demonstrated that the country remains susceptible to existential
the SEC), repealed by Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119
Stat. 594.
66 See Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 75-696, ch. 10, 52 Stat. 840, 883–905
(1938), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat.
2549 (1978).
67 Letter from William O. Douglas, Professor, Yale L. Sch., to Felix
Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard L. Sch. 2 (Feb. 19, 1934); Letter from William O. Douglas, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Henry A. Wallace, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. 3–4 (Apr. 11, 1938) (on file with the William
O. Douglas Collection, Library of Congress) (advocating a system of government investment banking).
68 See, e.g., Labaton, supra note 60.
69 Volcker Rule, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/volcker-rule.htm
[https://perma.cc/R5LF-FBP6] (last updated Jan. 30, 2020); Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, §
619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620–31 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 1851
(2019)).
70
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §
111(b)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 5321(b)(1)).
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crises of the sort seen in 1929. But the threats that loom largest today—climate change and pandemics, for example—are
more environmental than financial. They seem removed from
the core of securities law, although politicians will endeavor
to squeeze them in, as with conflict minerals.71 It seems unlikely that finance will prove the key battleground for working
out larger issues of government anytime soon, as it did in the
Thirties and Forties. The enactment of PUHCA in 1935,72 and
the Chenery cases in the 1940s,73 were major steps forward in
bold experiments in government. So, too, albeit in a different
space, were the implied private rights of action cases decided
by the Court in the 1960s.74 Those cases gave rise to the concept of the “private attorney general,” revolutionary in its
day.75 Today, the securities cases that do reach the Court do
not seem important even for the securities field itself, much
less for any other area of the law or government.
The run of Democratic control of both the White House and
Congress that paved the way for the federal securities laws in
the Thirties has given way to frequently divided government
and regular trading of control of the White House and the two
chambers of Congress.76 That alternating hold on power has
71 Requirement of Report Regarding Disclosure of Registrant’s Supply
Chain Information Regarding Conflict Minerals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13p-1
(2020) (reporting requirements for registered companies that need conflict
minerals for “the functionality or production of a product manufactured” by
the company).
72 Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA), Pub. L. No. 74-333,
49 Stat. 803 (1935), repealed by Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 10958, 119 Stat. 594.
73
SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943); SEC v.
Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
74 See, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430–31 (1964) (recognizing a private cause of action under Rule 14a-9 of the Securities Exchange
Act).
75 See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 61 & n.13 (1977)
(Stevens, J. dissenting)) (describing and defending private attorney general
enforcement of securities, antirust, and civil rights law).
76 From 1933 until 1947, Democrats controlled the Presidency, the
House, and the Senate. One political party has not had a unified government for more than four years in a row since 1969. See Party Divisions of
the House of Representatives, 1789 to Present, U.S. HOUSE OF
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generated little legislation to drive the Court’s caseload in securities, as PUHCA did in the Forties. Tender offer regulation,
which generated a brief run of cases after Congress enacted
the Williams Act in 1968, no longer gets any attention from
the Court.77 Proxy regulation has infrequently returned to the
Court since the lightning bolt of J. I. Case Co. v. Borak in 1964
gave rise to implied rights of action.78 The spike in the Court’s
securities docket during Powell’s time can mainly be attributed to his influence;79 Congress did next to nothing in the
field of securities law during Powell’s era to provoke a judicial
response. The two biggest deregulatory acts in the history of
federal securities law, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)80 and the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012,81 both passed during times of
divided government,82 have not generated Supreme Court
cases that changed the direction of securities law, much less
the law more generally. The key PSLRA issues were largely
resolved by Congress, leaving the Court to resolve residual
REPRESENTATIVES,
https://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/ [https://perma.cc/4KWH-ZSGP] (last visited Mar. 3,
2021); Party Division, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm [https://perma.cc/39FL-QJCK] (last visited Mar. 3, 2021); Presidents, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-whitehouse/presidents/ [https://perma.cc/A3GT-S67A] (last visited Mar. 3, 2021).
77 See, e.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975). The
most recent Supreme Court case interpreting the Williams Act was decided
in 1997. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
78 Borak, 377 U.S. at 430–31.
79 See supra Section II.D.
80 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L.
No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
81 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), Pub. L. No.
112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
82 Republicans controlled one or both houses of Congress, while Democrats were in the White House for both. See Party Divisions of the House of
Representatives, 1789 to Present, supra note 76; Party Division, supra note
76; Presidents, supra note 76. Congress adopted the PSLRA over President
Bill Clinton’s veto. MITCHEL A. SOLLENBERGER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 98-147,
PRESIDENT CLINTON’S VETOES 2 tbl.1 (2004).
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ambiguity, a routine task of statutory interpretation.83 We
have not seen a return to the wholesale judicial legislation of
the 1960s, with the Court filling in gaps in securities laws after two decades of Congressional neglect. The issues raised by
the JOBS Act—new regulatory exemptions for Reg A+ or private offerings or resales,84 or broader ways to avoid public
company status85—have yet to generate any litigation for the
Court and seem unlikely to do so. The important issues will
be resolved by the SEC with minimal judicial intervention.
Another key factor that has historically pushed securities
law to the fore of the work of the Supreme Court—the presence of Justices with experience or interest in the field—has
also disappeared. We do not anticipate the return of a Justice
with a deep personal knowledge of the regulatory context of
securities law, a key feature of all three periods discussed
above. There has been no Justice with knowledge or experience in the field of securities since Powell retired in 1987. If
anything, that gulf is wider than even the long passage of time
suggests. Except for Chief Justice John Roberts, the Justices
have who have joined the Court since Powell left have had no
sustained experience working as attorneys for private entities.86 Former academics and government lawyers now dominate the Court. All but one Justice—Justice Elena Kagan, who
had been Solicitor General after a career as an academic—
came to the Court from one of the federal appellate courts.87
Roosevelt’s appointees, by contrast, had cut their teeth in
drafting the securities statutes, litigating the constitutional
83 See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, Securities Law in the Roberts Court: Agenda
or Indifference?, 37 J. CORP. L. 105, 108–09 (2011).
84 See JOBS Act sec. 401, § 3(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (2019)).
85 See, e.g., JOBS Act § 501 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(A)).
86 See Coates, supra note 42, at 26. John Roberts served as an appellate
lawyer at a law firm for nearly fifteen years. See Aaron M. Houck, John G.
Roberts, Jr., BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-GRoberts-Jr (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review) (last updated
Jan. 23, 2021). However, he spent about as much of his career practicing in
the public sector as in the private sector, and his work as an appellate lawyer at a Washington law firm traded on his government experience. See id.
87 Current Members, SUP. CT., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx [https://perma.cc/98KT-ZPJQ] (last visited Mar. 3, 2021).
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status of those statutes, or running the SEC.88 Given the current state of the nomination process, the likelihood that another Justice Powell is nominated to renew the Supreme
Court’s interest in securities law seems vanishingly small.
Where does that leave the Court in the field of securities
law? The obvious answer is the continuance of the current
norm, which has persisted since Powell left the Court in 1987.
The Court takes far fewer securities cases, and its opinions
bounce back and forth between those that expand the reach of
regulation and those that cut it back. Rarely does a Supreme
Court opinion make much of a difference at all to the practice
of securities law. Basic Inc v. Levinson is the exception that
proves the rule, and even that decision stands out for its failure to grapple with the enormous economic consequences it
engendered.89 The Court, presented with an opportunity to
rein in the class action juggernaut it had released, took a pass
in Halliburton II, going out of its way to disclaim any judicial
role in reforming securities class actions notwithstanding the
judiciary’s role in creating that cottage industry.90 The Court
instead left it to Congress to develop any reforms. Given that
hands off approach, underscored by the meandering path that
the Court has followed for thirty years—a third of the Supreme Court’s history with the federal securities law—we cannot discount the likelihood that the Court will continue to
wander in the field of securities law.

B. New Sources of Securities Litigation before the
Supreme Court
The random walk is the most obvious prospect, but not all
that interesting. The theme of this Symposium calls on us to
speculate, so we will. What could change the Court’s direction

See supra Section II.A.
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246–47 (1987) (permitting class
action plaintiffs in a private securities fraud action under Rule 10b-5 to invoke a rebuttable presumption of reliance, opening the way for broader set
of 10b-5 claims against public companies).
90 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund (Halliburton II), 573 U.S. 258,
277 (2014) (“These concerns are more appropriately left to Congress[.]”).
88
89
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in securities law? One possibility is the impact of rapidly advancing technology and international competition on securities markets. It also seems possible that administrative law
will return to the fore, this time driven by Chevron concerns.
The latter possibility may be prompted by new federal regulatory interventions to expand federal rules for public corporations.

1. Technology Advances and Market Innovations
Technology has disrupted securities markets in the
twenty-first century more than either politics or any financial
crisis. Consider, for example, the strict regulatory approach of
the Securities Act with regards to new issues of securities.91
The Securities Act provoked controversy almost immediately
upon its enactment.92 The intrusive regulatory approach of
the initial act, with its draconian liability standards, survived
an immediate effort to water it down during the first year after its passage.93 In the decades that followed, the Act maintained a strongly pro-regulatory approach. Wall Street made
an uneasy peace with the regime developed by the SEC, perhaps because the industry profited from its anti-competitive
aspects.94 Nonetheless, the Act’s rigorous disclosure requirements and liability provisions have pushed market intermediaries to develop technologically-driven alternatives. As a result, the economic footprint of the Act has been limited.
91
92

See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2019).
See Pritchard & Thompson, New Deal Justices, supra note 1, at 856–

57.
See id.
Cf. Letter from Thomas Corcoran to Felix Frankfurter, Professor,
Harvard L. Sch. 1 (May 11, 1934), http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f4405e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1930/1934_05_11_Corcoran_to_Frank.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7AV6EYVN] (“If Ray [Moley] is any barometer of what’s going on in the White
House mind, the plan of battle is to avoid any further attempt at reforms
that might bring down more criticism during the present Congress, arrange
a ‘truce of God’, reorganize the machinery down here to help along business
recovery this summer, and in every other way postpone all other considerations to the necessarily primary objective of winning the Congressional elections.”).
93
94
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Direct listing has now transformed from a seldom used
means of accessing public trading markets into an attractive
option.95 Companies following that route can raise new capital
without jumping through the traditional hoops of extensive
disclosure, SEC staff review, and market intermediaries
whose potential liability has provided a restraining influence
on issuer overreach.96
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs), have
gained an even larger presence as an alternative way to go
public, essentially splitting the IPO process in two and bypassing some of the traditional scrutiny IPOs receive.97 Public
investors are invited to buy shares in an empty shell company
(i.e., a non-operating company) backed by a sponsor, often a
celebrity.98 Only after the SPAC has gone public does the
sponsor focus on a suitable, privately-held acquisition candidate; a merger leaves the operating company as the surviving
entity—now with publicly traded shares. The key difference is
that the price of the operating company is not set, as in a traditional IPO by an investment banker’s “book building” to see
what price public investors are willing to pay for the shares,
but rather by the sponsor negotiating the price with the private company’s managers.99 This alternative process has
95 The SEC approved new and broadened NYSE rules for direct listing
in December 2020 as consistent with the Exchange Act. See Order Setting
Aside Action by Delegated Authority and Approving a Proposed Rule
Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 2, To Amend Chapter One of the
Listed Company Manual To Modify the Provisions Relating to Direct Listings, 85 Fed. Reg. 85,807, 85,807–10 (Dec. 29, 2020).
96 See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in
Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337,
338–39 (2013) (discussing attempts to avoid these obligations).
97 Amrith Ramkumar & Maureen Farrell, When SPACs Attack! A New
Force Is Invading Wall Street, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2021, 12:00 AM) (on file
with the Columbia Business Law Review), https://www.wsj.com/articles/when-spacs-attack-a-new-force-is-invading-wall-street-11611378007.
98 See Celebrities Involvement with SPACS—Investor Alert, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alertsand-bulletins/celebrity-involvement-spacs-investor-alert
[https://perma.cc/R5HW-GJ8V].
99 See Ramkuma & Farrell, supra note 97 (describing several such arrangements).
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allowed more ordinary investors to participate in IPOs, albeit
in a more volatile market that has been more susceptible to
short selling.100
Apart from these lightly-regulated ways to go public, the
dramatic changes in availability of private capital have made
it possible for startup companies to fund their capital needs
for a much longer time without going to the public markets.101
The growth of private equity and venture capital have made
the public markets optional for many growth companies. Such
deep pools of finance were unavailable for most of the twentieth century. Regulatory changes have also facilitated the
trend of staying private longer or even indefinitely. The JOBS
Act raised the threshold for the number of shareholders that
a company can have before triggering public company status,
which carries with it the disclosure and governance requirements of the Exchange Act.102
None of these market innovations affecting the regulatory
footprint of securities laws have yet to find their way to the
Supreme Court. The greater reliance on private finance and
markets has left a greater share of securities transactions outside the space from which the Supreme Court has traditionally drawn its securities docket.
One of the most prominent examples in the innovative
space known as FinTech has been bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. In the initial period of bitcoin use, it regularly

100 See Matt Wirz & Juliet Chung, Short Sellers Boost Bets Against
SPACs, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2021, 5:30 AM) (on file with the Columbia
Business Law Review), https://www.wsj.com/articles/short-sellers-boostbets-against-spacs-11615714200.
101 See Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the
Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL
L. REV. 1573, 1604–24 (2013) (tracing changes in the regulatory environment and noting that startup companies have “[a]n alternative . . . to bypass
[the securities] regulatory systems by staying indefinitely in the private, accredited-only markets” and that such an alternative is a “threat to public
markets like NASDAQ and NYSE”).
102 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), Pub. L. No. 112106, sec. 501, § 12(g)(1)(A), 126 Stat. 306, 326 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78l(g)(1)(A) (2019)).
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generated the question whether the bitcoin itself was a security.103 The definition of a security is a question that has come
before the Court more often than any other issue since
1933.104 The SEC initially took a cautious approach with cryptocurrency, suggesting it could be a security, but not launching widespread enforcement.105 More recently, cryptocurrency
issues have moved away from the definition of a security. Instead, the debate around digital currencies addresses broader
questions of payment systems and foreign exchange. Central
bank digital currencies and Digital Dollars pose complex questions regarding public and private developments of crypto
money as innovative digital forms of currency.106 The move
toward a cashless society has accelerated in recent years.
These developments could remake the business of companies
focused on payment systems. International issues likely will
be recurring questions given the potential to transform foreign exchange transactions and the potential effects on the
money supply affecting both domestic economies and international economics. These questions could come to the Supreme
Court, but it is unlikely they will put securities law at center
stage.

103 See, e.g., generally, Jeffrey E. Alberts & Bertrand Fry, Is Bitcoin a
Security?, 21 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 1 (2015).
104 See, e.g., generally, SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946);
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985); Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990); SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004).
105 See Kevin Helms, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton Explains US Crypto
Regulation, Calls Bitcoin a Store of Value, BITCOIN: NEWS (Nov. 23, 2020),
https://news.bitcoin.com/us-cryptocurrency-regulation-sec-chairman-jayclayton-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/2UUX-ZG2J] (reporting SEC Chairman
Jay Clayton’s statement that “we are going to see more regulation around
the payment space” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
106 See, e.g., generally John Crawford, Lev Menand & Morgan Ricks,
FedAccounts: Digital Dollars, 89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113 (2021); Paul Wong
& Jesse Leigh Maniff, Comparing Means of Payment: What Role for a Central Bank Digital Currency?, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://doi.org/10.17016/2380-7172.2739
[https://perma.cc/5HD5-MQF2]
(last updated Apr. 12, 2021).
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2. Chevron Questions
One area that could take the Court’s work in securities law
back to its origins is the Chevron doctrine. The doctrine takes
its name from the Court’s unanimous 1984 decision upholding
an Environmental Protection Agency regulation interpreting
multiple pollution devices as a single statutory source under
the Clean Air Act,107 but it has become the central focus of
administrative law more generally. The case arose under environmental statutes, but the underlying issue hearkens back
to the Court’s earliest interactions with the securities laws. In
particular, the Court’s 1940s securities decisions frequently
sounded more in administrative law generally, rather than
the specifics of securities law. The central question in many of
the Court’s decisions that decade—most prominently in
Chenery I and II—turned on how to interpret statutory silence. How much deference would the Court afford the SEC in
filling in gaps in legislation? (The answer then was quite a
lot).108 The Court held in Chevron, generally consistent with
the views of the Court in Chenery II, that where Congress has
not directly spoken on the precise question at issue, the
agency determination is entitled to deference if it is a “reasonable accommodation of . . . competing interests.”109
The Court’s Chevron holding found a booster in Justice Antonin Scalia, even though he did not join the Court until two
years after the decision. Soon after coming to the Court, Scalia
devoted a law school lecture to Chevron’s defense.110 More recent conservative Justices have been more skeptical, most notably Justice Clarence Thomas, who has specifically urged the
Court to reexamine the doctrine.111 Justices Samuel Alito,

107 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
866 (1984).
108 SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 92 (1943); SEC v.
Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 201–-03 (1947).
109 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
110 See generally Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511.
111 See Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 761–64 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh have expressed skepticism, if not hostility, toward the doctrine.112 The challenge has
been described as a desire to turn away from a system of bureaucratic rule that “has its root[s] in . . . the Progressive
Era.”113 Those “roots” got room to grow from the New Deal
Justices who played such an important role in enacting and
defending the fledgling securities laws in the 1930s. Skepticism of Chevron strikes at the heart of the Progressive faith
in expert decisionmaking that drove the creation of the SEC.
The issue of deference to administrative agencies might
well come to the fore during a time in which the presidency
and the agencies are in the hands of one party, but legislative
initiatives remain difficult with Congress closely divided. The
current political environment, with a clear majority of the
Court having been appointed by Republican Presidents and a
Democrat in the White House working with thin majorities in
both houses of Congress, may set the stage for a sequel to the
confrontations of the 1930s. If such a disagreement arose in
the field of securities law, a likely setting might be SEC rulemaking relating to climate change disclosure or political contributions by public companies, current lightning rods on the
SEC’s potential regulatory agenda.

112 See Jonathan H. Adler, Shunting Aside Chevron Deference, THE
REGUL. REV. (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/08/07/adlershunting-aside-chevron-deference/ [https://perma.cc/99BB-BT6N]; Kent
Barnett, Christina L. Boyd & Christopher J. Walker, Judge Kavanaugh,
Chevron Deference, and the Supreme Court, THE REGUL. REV. (Sept. 3, 2018),
https://www.theregreview.org/2018/09/03/barnett-boyd-walker-kavanaughchevron-deference-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/RW96-Q3WE] (recounting Justice Kavanaugh’s doubts about Chevron); Gutierrez-Brizuela v.
Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152–58 (2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
113 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 129 n.6 (2015) (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment); see also Examining the Federal Regulatory
System to Improve Accountability, Transparency and Integrity: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 3 (2015) (statement of
Charles J. Cooper, Founding Partner and Chairman, Cooper & Kirk, PLLC)
(“This vision of expansive bureaucratic power took hold in the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence in the early twentieth century, particularly during
the New Deal.”).
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3. Federal Corporate Law as a Possible TwentyFirst Century Setting
Corporate governance rules have long been the province of
state law. Dissatisfaction with the perceived management
bias in such rules has generated recurring efforts to displace
the state system with federal incorporation. The initial push
for federal incorporation during the Progressive period at the
turn of the twentieth century garnered the most attention,
with three consecutive Presidents—Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson—supporting the
move but no bill ever clearing Congress.114 During the New
Deal, key players such as Adolf Berle and William O. Douglas
supported federal incorporation,115 but they never persuaded
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who had other political priorities.
Instead, the federal securities legislation of the 1930s—with
the notable exceptions of PUHCA and the Chandler Act—focused on disclosure to help make effective the corporate governance rights conferred by state law on shareholders. William Cary, who personified the reinvigoration of securities
regulation as Chair of the SEC during the 1960s, triggered a
boomlet for federal corporate law with his insider trading decision for the SEC in 1961 in Cady Roberts.116 After his return
to Columbia Law, Cary wrote an important law review article
in the 1970s calling for federal minimum standards for corporations.117 No broad legislation followed, however, as
114 See generally Camden Hutchinson, Progressive Era Conceptions of
the Corporation and the Failure of the Federal Chartering Movement, 2017
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1017 (discussing the Progressive Era history of federal
incorporation, the presidential support for it, and its loss of momentum during the Wilson administration).
115 Letter from William O. Douglas, Professor, Yale L. Sch., to A.A.
Berle, Jr., Professor, Columbia L. Sch. (Jan. 3, 1934) (on file with the William O. Douglas Collection, Library of Congress) (“You can count on me to
pull an oar on federal incorporation . . . . [P]erhaps we can begin to get at
the really fundamental problem of the increment of power and profit inherent in our present forms of organization[.]”).
116 See generally Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
117 William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law, Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 700 (1974).
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Congress was distracted by more salient political questions in
the post-Watergate era. The only legislation was the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977118 targeting foreign bribery by
U.S. companies, which fit awkwardly in the pattern of the federal securities laws.
Instead, one-off pieces of legislation provided repeated, if
never comprehensive, federal requirements for public corporations. For example, the two most significant securities statutes of the twenty-first century, Sarbanes–Oxley in 2002119
and Dodd–Frank in 2010,120 for the first time provided federal
rules as to the required composition of boards of directors, requiring that the audit and compensation committees be comprised of independent directors.121 State laws, by contrast, say
nothing about requirements for directors. Federal law has
also increased the items on which shareholders must vote, including requiring their approval of executive compensation,
albeit only in an advisory role.122 The SEC, too, continues to
use its existing powers to create broader disclosure requirements and to expand shareholder rights. SEC rules have expanded disclosure in multiple areas to regulate the substance
of corporate governance indirectly through “comply or explain” disclosure requirements.123 The agency was requiring
disclosure to put a thumb on the scale, not issuing mandates.

118 Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 to -3).
119 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat.
745, 775–77 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2019)) (directing the SEC to
refuse to list issuers without an audit committee that is entirely independent).
120 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900–03 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j-3) (directing the SEC to decline to list issuers without an independent
compensation committee).
121 Principal executive officers must certify that they have reported to
the independent committees. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14(b)(5) (2020).
122 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(i), 78n-1.
123 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(1) (2020) (“If the registrant does not
have a standing nominating committee or committee performing similar
functions, state the basis for the view of the board of directors that it is
appropriate for the registrant not to have such a committee and identify
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The D.C. Circuit—the most common court for reviews of
regulatory challenges—has on occasion struck down SEC
rulemaking efforts, particularly if new rules strayed beyond
disclosure. For example, the appellate court struck down SEC
rulemaking in 1990 that effectively banned dual class shares,
a management entrenchment device which long had been permitted by state laws.124 The court reasoned that the rule
would establish a federal corporate law which exceeded the
agency’s statutory authority.125 Twenty years later, another
D.C. Circuit panel struck down an SEC rule that expanded
shareholder powers to use the company’s proxy to nominate
candidates for election to the board of directors.126 That challenge could have been based on federalism, as was the one to
dual class rulemaking just discussed. During the SEC rulemaking process, however, Congress in the Dodd–Frank Act
included a specific section authorizing the agency to adopt
such a rule,127 so the appellate court instead rejected the rule
as arbitrary and capricious for failing the cost-benefit requirements for SEC rulemaking imposed by the Exchange Act.128
Neither of these decisions were reviewed by the Supreme
Court. But if a securities case were to be the basis for a Chevron decision, it likely would be one grounded in corporate governance rulemaking or a disclosure mandate relating to corporate social responsibility. Proposals for federal
incorporation resurfaced during the Democratic presidential
primaries in 2020 but failed to gain much traction.129 Proposals relating to corporate social responsibility have become
each director who participates in the consideration of director nominees.”);
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 406(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7264(a)) (requiring companies to adopt a code of ethics or explain why they have not).
124 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
125 Id. at 412
126 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
127 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 971(a), § 14(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(2)).
128 Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148.
129 See, e.g., Empowering Workers Through Accountable Capitalism,
WARREN DEMOCRATS, https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/accountable-capitalism [https://perma.cc/Z4AL-YBRD].
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a prominent part of progressives’ political agenda for public
corporations.130 If one or more became part of the SEC’s
agenda, a challenge in the D.C. Circuit—which retains a majority of Democratic appointees—would be likely. It is not difficult to imagine that such a challenge to agency rulemaking
on Chevron grounds might attract the Supreme Court’s attention.

IV. CONCLUSION
The securities context that so captured the New Deal
Court’s embrace of agency deference—in the Chenery cases
and others—might well provide a twenty-first century Supreme Court revisit of that almost century-old switch. Absent
such a combination, securities are likely to be something of a
backwater for some time to come, with meandering results.
The pathbreaking role that securities law played during the
New Deal and the Sixties and Seventies remains a remote possibility for the Supreme Court as currently configured.

See, e.g., BUS. ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON THE PURPOSE OF A COR1
(2021),
https://system.businessroundtable.org/app/uploads/sites/5/2021/02/BRT-Statement-on-the-Purpose-of-a-CorporationFeburary-2021-compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9CD-4NQB]. The Business Roundtable released its statement in 2019, but it continues to collect
signatures. Id.
130
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